FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeriesFederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print)ISSN2767-3898(Online)CorporateMergersandAcquisitionsUnderLenderScrutinyBuhuiQIu,TengWang2024-025Pleasecitethispaperas:QIu,Buhui,andTengWang(2024).“CorporateMergersandAcquisitionsUnderLenderScrutiny,”FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2024-025.Washington:BoardofGov-ernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.025.NOTE:StaffworkingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.TheanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchstaffortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.CorporateMergersandAcquisitionsUnderLenderScrutinyBuhuiQiu†TengWang‡§UniversityofSydneyFederalReserveBoardJanuary2024AbstractThispaperexaminescorporatemergersandacquisitions(M&A)outcomesunderlenderscrutiny.UsingtheuniqueshocksofU.S.supervisorystresstesting,wefindthatfirmsunderincreasedlenderscrutinyaftertheirrelationshipbanksfailstresstestsengageinfewerbuthigher-qualityM&Adeals.Evidencefromcomprehensivesupervisorydatarevealsimprovedcreditqualityfornewlyo...
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